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I. Introduction
Material constitution and physical realization are both relations that have
been used in articulating views in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind.
For example, Lynne Baker1 has recently defended the idea that material con-
stitution is a general relation that holds between statues and what they are
made of, dollar bills and pieces of paper, and persons and bodies, contin-
uing a longer tradition within metaphysics that takes constitution to be an
important relation holding between pairs of things in the world.2 Appeal
to physical realization, especially to multiple realization, has been central to
the discussion of mental causation and non-reductive forms of materialism
about the mind.3
Both constitution and realization are often contrasted with the relation
of identity. Formally, identity is reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive. Con-
stitution and realization, by contrast, are irreflexive and asymmetrical. But
are constitution and realization transitive relations?
In metaphysics, the view that material constitution is transitive is ubiq-
uitous, an assumption expressed by both proponents and critics of con-
stitution views.4 Likewise, it is typically assumed within the philosophy of
mind that physical realization is a transitive relation. In both cases, this
assumption of transitivity plays a role in discussion of the broader implica-
tions of a metaphysics that invokes either relation. Here I provide reasons
for questioning this assumption and the uses to which this appeal to tran-
sitivity is put. As my title suggests, I shall focus on the case of material
constitution, using a brief discussion of realization at the outset to motivate
the discussion of the transitivity of material constitution at the core of the
paper.
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There are at least two ways in which a prima facie plausible appeal to the
transitivity of a relation can fail. First, it might fail because a relation that
appears to be transitive in fact is not transitive. An appeal to the transitivity
of the relation “always defeats” in drawing conclusions about who will win
soccer finals or hockey play-offs exemplifies this first kind of failure. Sec-
ond, such an appeal might fail because the logical form of the arguments
assuming transitivity is not one to which the rule of transitivity applies. The
interesting and, in the current context, relevant such failures are those in
which arguments relying on a rule of transitivity appear to be of the correct
logical form but in fact are not. For example, consider the following simple
argument:
Tall Slim is bigger than Bulky
Bulky is bigger than Beanstalk
Tall Slim is bigger than Beanstalk
Here the inference from premises to conclusion relies on the assumption that
“bigger than” is transitive, and the argument appears to be of just the right
logical form for the rule of transitivity to apply. But as the names in the
example, might suggest, it is possible for the premises here to be true yet
the conclusion false, if Tall Slim’s being taller than Bulky is the basis for the
first premise, while Bulky’s being heavier than Beanstalk is the basis for the
second premise.5 In short, understood in this way, this argument equivocates
on the meaning of the relational predicate “is bigger than”. Thus, despite
appearances, the argument is not of the correct logical form to legitimately
appeal to the transitivity of “bigger than”. This remains true even if both
disambiguations of the predicate are themselves transitive.
The basic claim of this paper is that a range of innocent-looking arguments
that assume the transitivity of material constitution suffer from either or both
of these failures. To shift from merely motivating examples to a context closer
to those targets, let’s return to the relation of physical realization.
2. The Transitivity of Physical Realization
Even though “constituted by” and “realized by” are sometimes used inter-
changeably, material constitution has typically been invoked in discussions
of the relationship between physically-bounded material entities, such as
physical objects, while physical realization has been invoked in characteriz-
ing pairs of properties, processes, events, and states, where these typically
have been thought to occur at distinct levels of organization. The issue of
whether realized properties (such as mental properties) are something more
than their realizers (such as neural properties) is manifest in debates over the
related problems of mental causation and of the epiphenomenal nature of
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the mental, as well as in discussions of the causal powers of mental states, of
reductionism about the mind, and of individualism about the mental.
Perhaps due to the centrality of such debates and discussions to the phi-
losophy of mind over the past twenty years, the idea that there are distinct
concepts of realization—and so the possibility of equivocation in arguments
that appeal to realization—is well established. For example, over 25 years
ago Sydney Shoemaker introduced the distinction between what he called
core (or partial) and total realizations in diagnosing an equivocation in an
influential argument that Ned Block and Jerry Fodor had given against a
functionalist account of qualitative mental states.6 Building on that distinc-
tion, I have more recently argued that both core and total realizations may
extend beyond the boundary of the individual with the corresponding prop-
erties, and in effect have appealed to this kind of equivocation to challenge
what I call smallist views in metaphysics that fail to recognize extended or
wide realizations of mental and other properties.7
What of the transitivity of realization and the role that it plays in argu-
ments as simple in apparent form as that with which we began? While both
partial and total realization each appear to be transitive relations, equivoca-
tion between the two undermines the applicability of the rule of transitivity to
mediate many otherwise innocent-looking inferences. For example, consider
the following argument:
A. Eve’s believing that p is realized by having a token of p in her head.
B. Having a token of p in one’s head is realized by some detailed, neural state.
C. Eve’s believing that p is realized by some detailed neural state.
Premise (A) is a vivid, popular, cartoon version of a more serious, function-
alist account of what believing a proposition is, but what I am about to say
of it applies to that more serious account.8 The plausibility of (A) requires
that “realization” refer to a partial or core realization of the relevant belief
state, for two reasons. First, (A) says something about the particular bit of
Eve’s total psychological state that concerns this particular belief. Second,
the externalist arguments that originate in the thought experiments of Hilary
Putnam and Tyler Burge have led to widespread recognition that having a
particular belief depends, in part, on being located in the appropriate linguis-
tic or physical contexts. If realizations are to be metaphysically sufficient for
the properties that they realize, as is commonly assumed, then total realiza-
tions of the propositional attitudes will typically extend beyond the boundary
of the organism. Thus, any traditional functionalist account of (say) belief
will specify at most a core or partial realization of that state.9 Yet the notion
of realization used in (B) is that of total realization.10 Hence, even grant-
ing the truth of both (A) and (B), one cannot appeal to the transitivity of
realization to arrive at (C), since the argument equivocates on “realization”.
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Is the relation of physical realization itself transitive? Although I have just
said that both partial and total realization appear to be transitive relations,
whether this is true of realization per se turns on what varieties of realization
there are and how they are understood or analyzed. In other work, for
example, I have re-articulated the conception of a core realization as the part
of a total realization that is most causally salient, and on this account of what
core realizations are, they are not transitive.11 In a series of papers, Carl Gillett
has argued that the standard ways of thinking about realization are governed
by principles that apply at best to a skewed range of examples, and that we
need an enriched framework for conceptualizing how realization operates
across the sciences.12 It may turn out that the transitivity of realization ends
up on this list of principles, and that there turn out to be a number of forms
of realization that are not transitive.
I shall argue that this is very much the situation in the case of the rela-
tion of material constitution. But I first want to underscore the prima facie
transitivity of this relation before motivating challenges to it.
3. Probing the Transitivity of Material Constitution
Having already noted the ubiquity of the assumption that the relation of
material constitution is transitive, this underscoring can be brief. Consider a
standard and representative example, involving a metal chain, in which the
transitivity of material constitution operates as an assumption:13
1a. This chain is constituted by metal links.
1b. Those metal links are constituted by physical particles.
1c. This chain is constituted by physical particles.
Premises (1a) and (1b), together with the assumption of the transitivity
of material constitution, entail (1c). With that assumption, this argument
is valid. In addition, both of these premises are true, and so if material
constitution is transitive, the conclusion must be true as well.
In characterizing this example as “standard and representative”, I mean to
imply that it is typical of a variety of examples in which material constitution
appears as a transitive relation holding between constituted entities and
constituents: a liquid in a glass and the molecules of water that constitute it; a
garden and the plants, soil, and other features that comprise that garden; and
even a person’s body and the various body parts (e.g., arms) or bodily systems
(e.g., the circulatory system) that make up that body. Such examples may
feature either singular or plural referring expressions, definite or indefinite
descriptions, or proper names or common noun phrases. The question is
whether such arguments are fully representative of arguments that appeal to
the transitivity of material constitution.14
The Transitivity of Material Constitution 367
Consider an example that, in this respect, might be thought to contrast
with argument (1), one that involves Eve’s counterpart, Adam:
2a. Adam is constituted by his body.
2b. Adam’s body is constituted by physical particles.
2c. Adam is constituted by physical particles.
While this argument may appear to have just the same form as (1), here the
conclusion (2c) will strike at least some as problematic in a way in which (1c)
does not. The underlying intuition is something like this: unlike a metal chain,
which is nothing more than links arranged in a certain way, and so ultimately
nothing more than physical particles arranged in a corresponding way (to
constitute links, appropriately arranged), a person is something more than
physical particles, however they are arranged, and so ultimately something
more than physical particles, however they are arranged. The question is
whether such an intuition is defensible and, if so, what we should say about
the argument from (2a), (2b) and the transitivity of material constitution to
(2c).
Several reasons can be given for rejecting the view that (1) and (2) differ
in the way described above, none of which I think are adequate. Materialists
might view what I referred to as the “underlying intuition” as signifying
an explicit or implicit dualist (or even immaterialist) view of the nature of
persons, claiming that consistency requires that we treat persons just as we
treat any other material object, such as a metal chain, a glass of water,
a garden, and a physiological body. They might well point to the formal
parallels between our two arguments as underwriting this consistency claim.
In effect, this would be to reject the intuition that (1c) is true yet (2c) false
by claiming that (2c)’s rejection turns on the rejection of (2a), whether as
an explicit denial based on a commitment to dualism about persons, or as
an entailment of one’s other commitments. Dualists are mistaken, however,
to deny (2a); proponents of material constitution views in metaphysics are at
least typically committed to (2a), and so, the argument goes, (2c).
That these appeals to materialism and to consistency are not only distinct
but need to be separated out becomes apparent when we turn from (2) to
another standard example that has featured in the literature on constitution
views in metaphysics, that of statues and their constituent matter. Consider
Michelangelo’s David and the piece of marble that constitutes it. We can
readily construct an argument that shares the apparent form of our previous
two arguments:
3a. David is constituted by a piece of marble.
3b. This piece of marble is constituted by physical particles.
3c. David is constituted by physical particles.
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Again, just as some will resist embracing (2c), some will resist embracing
(3c), and for much the same reason. We can point to the same kind of
intuition about a chain being nothing more than physical particles arranged
in a certain way, yet a statue being something more than this, as a basis for
thinking that (3) is problematic in a way in which (1) is not. Whatever else we
say about this intuition, it is implausible to say that it stems from a dualist (let
alone immaterialist) view of the nature of statues. Suppose that this is correct,
and that we should look for a unified treatment of both sets of intuitions, and
so of (2) about persons and (3) about statues. Then in determining whether
these intuitions are defensible we need to focus on claims of consistency and
what claims constitution theorists are committed to.
I believe that these arguments about persons and statues belong to a
large class of examples. In addition to (2) and (3), arguments beginning with
each of the following premises generate just the same kinds of underlying
intuitions:
4a. This dollar bill is constituted by a piece of paper.
5a. This flag is constituted by a piece of cloth.
6a. This gene is constituted by a sequence of DNA.
7a. This island is constituted by a landmass.
In short, there are persistent intuitions to the effect that all of these things—
persons, statues, dollar bills, flags, genes, and islands—are something more
than physical particles arranged in certain ways. And this is so despite the
fact that in each of the corresponding arguments (2) through (7) there is no
tendency to think that the same is true of the mediating premise that posits
a relation of material constitution between the constituent entity—a body, a
piece of marble, a piece of paper, a piece of cloth, a sequence of DNA, and
a landmass—and aggregates of physical particles.15
Does consistency thus require that all of these arguments, i.e., arguments
(1)–(7), be viewed in the same way, namely, as valid arguments that rely
on an assumption of the transitivity of constitution that is true? If so, then
the intuitions I have appealed to so far need to be given up. I shall argue,
however, that while there is a pattern to the arguments (2)–(7), these should
be distinguished from our initial argument (1), and from the larger class of
arguments that that original argument represents. This pattern provides the
basis for thinking that the intuitions mentioned above are defensible after all,
and thus for further probing into the appeal to the transitivity of material
constitution that each makes.
I shall propose that each of the arguments (2)–(7) equivocate on the
concept of constitution. David is constituted by a piece of marble, and that
piece of marble is constituted by physical particles, but not in the same sense.
The same is true of the corresponding arguments that begin with (4a)–(7a) as
premises and conclude by claiming that each of these constituted entities is
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constituted by physical particles. Thus, although the explicit premises of each
of these arguments are true, the arguments as a whole fail to be of the right
logical form to rely on an assumption of transitivity. In this respect, they are
like the case of “is bigger than” with which I began, and “is realized by” that
I continued with. But also like the case of realization, once we disambiguate
the meaning of “is materially constituted by” we will see reasons to question
whether at least one of the corresponding relations of material constitution
itself is transitive.
4. The Mere Addition and Arrangement of Matter Argument
To further motivate the idea that the intuitions separating (2)–(7) from (1) are
robust, and that they should be understood as reflective of an equivocation
in the former set of arguments, consider the following argument, which I call
the mere addition and arrangement of matter argument.
There is a general metaphysical difference between the relationship be-
tween some entities (like chains) and their constituent matter, and other
entities (like statues) and their constituent matter. Consider any chunk of
physical matter. If you merely add physical matter to this chunk, there will
be a way to do so that itself creates a chain. But there is no such way of pro-
ceeding here that creates a statue; the same is true of a dollar bill, a flag, a
gene, or an island. No mere addition and arrangement of matter can produce
instances of any of these kinds of entity, since what they are is determined, in
part, by the physical, biological, intentional, or social relations that pertain
in the broader locale of that constituent physical matter. To create those
entities, you need to ensure that whatever physical thing is created through
the addition and arrangement of matter to a particular physical chunk of
matter stands in the appropriate kinds of relations: statues to aesthetic prac-
tices, dollar bills and flags to social conventions, genes to larger systems of
inheritance and development, and islands to surrounding bodies of water.
To create some objects, such as chains, it is sufficient to add matter in a
particular way to a given arrangement of matter; to create others, such as
statues, dollar bills, flags, genes, and islands, no amount of such adding and
arranging will suffice. Rather, for such objects to exist, the world beyond
those objects needs to be (or have been) a certain way.16
This difference implies that, in (1), the relationship between constituent
matter (metal links) and constituted entity (chain) is necessitating: there is
some state or arrangement of the constituent matter that necessitates the
existence of the constituted entity. And it implies that, in at least (3a)–
(7a), the relationship between constituent matter and constituted entity is
not necessitating. Thus, the relations in these two sets of cases cannot be
identical, since they differ with respect to at least one property. But we
properly use “constitutes” to refer to both of these relations. Thus, there are
(at least) two concepts of constitution.
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To see how this connects up with the charge of equivocation in (2)–(7),
consider argument (3) again:
3a. David is constituted by a piece of marble.
3b. This piece of marble is constituted by physical particles.
3c. David is constituted by physical particles.
The relation of constitution referred to in (3b), like that referred to through-
out (1), is necessitating: there is some way to arrange physical particles that
necessitate your having a piece of marble. The relation referred to in (3a),
however, is not necessitating, since for David to exist—indeed, for any statue
to exist—a piece of marble must exist in a certain kind of context, one in
which it is produced through recognized artistic means, practices, and inten-
tions, and perhaps for some or other appreciative audience. An earthquake
200 000 years ago (i.e., before there were any of the relevant aesthetic prac-
tices) that produced something intrinsically identical to David from a chunk
of existing marble might have produced a piece of marble (indeed, many
pieces). But it could not have created a statue at all, let alone David. Hence,
(3), whose conclusion putatively follows from (3a) and (3b), together with
the assumption of the transitivity of constitution, equivocates between two
senses of “is constituted by”.
5. Two Concepts of Material Constitution
I have argued elsewhere that there are two concepts of material constitution,
and that they can be more precisely distinguished along the lines gestured
at in the previous section.17 These concepts share two necessary conditions
that I think any adequate analysis of material constitution must satisfy:
y is materially constituted by x during p only if
Coincidence: x is completely material in itself, or the xs are completely material in
themselves, and y is spatially and materially coincident with x (or the xs) during
p.
Distinctness: it is possible for x (the xs) to exist without there being anything of
y’s type that is (even partially) spatially and materially coincident with x (the xs).
These conditions are motivated by two central intuitions about material con-
stitution: that entities that stand in this relation bear a particularly intimate
or close physical relationship to one another (hence Coincidence), yet those
entities nonetheless have distinct conditions of existence, and so are not
strictly identical to one another (hence Distinctness).
These core intuitions, and thus the resulting conditions of Coincidence
and Distinctness, pull in opposite directions, the first of which suggests that
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materially constituted entities are nothing more than their constituents ar-
ranged in a particular way, and the second of which denies this suggestion.
Note that this is just the intuition that underpinned the putative difference
between (1), on the one hand, and (2)–(7), on the other, in our initial consid-
eration of appeals to the transitivity of material constitution. We might thus
wonder whether additional conditions could be added to Coincidence and
Distinctness to characterize two distinct concepts of material constitution.
A concept of constitution with additional conditions that, in effect, temper
any putative implication of Distinctness that x and y are (really) separate
entities—that is, further than Coincidence does already—would further nar-
rows the ontological gap between constituents and what they constitute. This
is just what one should expect of a concept underlying the “nothing more
than” intuition elicited by (1). And a concept of constitution that tempers
any putative implication of Coincidence that x and y are (really) strictly iden-
tical entities—that is, further than Distinctness does already—would widen
the ontological gap between constituents and what they constitute. This is
just what one should expect of a concept underlying the “something more
than” intuition elicited by (2)–(7).
The first of these concepts, what I call compositional constitution, has
two further necessary conditions, Intrinsic Necessitation and Constituent
Necessitation:
Intrinsic Necessitation: x is in some intrinsic state(s), or the xs that compose y are
arranged, during p such that x itself, or the xs themselves, necessitate the existence
of y.
Constituent Necessitation: whenever y exists, there must be something of x’s type
that is (at least partially) spatially and materially coincident with y.
It is compositional constitution that features in both premises and conclusion
in (1). As one might expect (given at least the name of this form of consti-
tution), we might well look to mereology, as the theory of the relationship
between parts and wholes, to further unpack the conditions that distinctively
characterize it.18
The second of these concepts, what I call ampliative constitution, is charac-
terized not by these necessitation conditions but by two conditions that direct
one beyond the part-whole relation to contextual and relational features of
both constituent and constituted entity:
Extrinsic Necessitation: x (the xs) is (are) in extrinsic conditions during p that
themselves necessitate the existence of y.
Relational/Intrinsic Constraint: y is relationally individuated and x (the xs) in-
trinsically individuated.
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The concept of ampliative constitution has been of particular importance
in recent discussion of constitution views of persons, and it is this concept
that has been drawn on, I believe, by Lynne Rudder Baker. Although Baker
favors a different analysis of the concept, one cast in terms of the notion
of primary kinds, there is much shared by her analysis and the one above.
Both attempt to articulate a view of material constitution that supports the
intuition that materially constituted entities are something more than their
constituting matter, however that matter is arranged.
There is much more to be said in defense of the distinction between
compositional and ampliative constitution, and the implications it has for
ongoing debates over constitution views in metaphysics.19 But I hope to have
said enough already to return to the particular focus of this paper: appeals
to the transitivity of material constitution.
6. Compositional vs Ampliative Constitution and Transitivity
Given the distinction between compositional and ampliative constitution, it
is relatively easy to explain why the appeal to transitivity in argument (1) is
unproblematic. Both premises and the conclusion use a notion of composi-
tional constitution, and compositional constitution (like composition itself)
is transitive. This is why the conclusion to (1) is viewed as unproblematically
true, and there is no even prima facie problem with the inference that leads
to it via the assumption of the transitivity of compositional constitution.
With (2)–(7), the situation is more complicated and interesting. Given the
argument of the paper to this point, the most natural view of these arguments
is as follows. Although they appear to have just the same logical form as (1),
in fact they all instantiate the following form, (F):
x is ampliatively constituted by y.
y is compositionally constituted by the zs.
x is ampliatively constituted by the zs.
That the conclusion to each of these arguments concerns ampliative consti-
tution is what explains the underlying intuition that the constituted entity in
the first premise and conclusion—a person, a statue, a dollar bill, a flag, a
gene, an island—is something more than the physical particles that constitute
it. Parity of reasoning suggests that the same is true of the first premises to
all of these arguments. Yet given that precisely this intuition is absent when
considering the corresponding second premises, each of which links a con-
stituent entity—a body, a piece of marble, a piece of paper, a piece of cloth, a
sequence of DNA, a landmass—to its physical constituents, it is not amplia-
tive but compositional constitution that is drawn on in that premise. If this
is correct, then these arguments equivocate on the concept of constitution in
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much the way that our opening arguments equivocated on “is bigger than”
and “is realized by”. Thus, they represent appeals to transitivity that fail for
the same reason that these arguments fail. Consider three further, related
issues.
The first concerns whether ampliative constitution is a transitive rela-
tion. As with the question of whether any particular form of the relation of
physical realization is transitive, this issue in part turns on which particular
analysis of ampliative constitution is correct. I have already noted the general
difference between Baker’s analysis of ampliative constitution, given in terms
of the notion of primary kinds, and the analysis I have offered above that
appeals to the Relational/Intrinsic Constraint. While Baker’s view is com-
patible with the transitivity of ampliative constitution (even if it constrains
the application of transitivity significantly, since few putative constituents
are primary kinds), a view that accepts the Relational/Intrinsic Constraint
is committed either to denying the transitivity of ampliative constitution,
or to claiming that the world is such that the conditions for using this rule
are never satisfied, since no one kind of entity can be both relationally and
intrinsically individuated. In contrast to the transitivity of compositional
constitution, the transitivity of ampliative constitution cannot simply be as-
sumed, since it may be incompatible with a viable analysis of ampliative
constitution.
The second issue concerns whether one might sidestep the question of
whether ampliative constitution is transitive in understanding the putative
difference between argument (1) and arguments (2)–(7). For suppose that
(2)–(7) all instantiate (F), as I have argued. One might argue that (F) does not
appeal to the transitivity of either ampliative or compositional constitution.
After all, one might say, one can just see that it is not of the right form to
support any such appeal to transitivity! Rather, (F) is its own truth-preserving
argument form. This implies that one can understand the difference between
(1), on the one hand, and (2)–(7), on the other, without claiming that these
latter arguments are invalid. On this view, despite appearances, (1) and (2)–(7)
instantiate different forms of argument both of which are truth-preserving,
the first relying on the transitivity of compositional constitution, the second
making no appeal to transitivity at all.
Suppose that this is what one ultimately says about the two argument
forms, and so there is a sense in which questions about the transitivity of
ampliative constitution are irrelevant to understanding the difference be-
tween (1) and (2)–(7). Two points: (i) in virtue of the form these arguments
appear to share, the issue of whether talk of material constitution can be
unproblematically combined with appeals to the transitivity of constitution
remains a live one. Minimally, in engaging in such talk there is a need to
clarify which concept of constitution is in play, just as there is in the case
of physical realization. To diagnose what goes wrong in at least some such
appeals, the analysis in terms of equivocation that I have given is revealing.
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(ii) the truth-preserving nature of (F) implies that whether or not amplia-
tive constitution is transitive, it is a relation that is preserved under at least
compositional constitution. For views such as my own, according to which
ampliative constitution is not transitive, arguments of the form of (F) provide
a means of articulating just how constitution can be used in an ontology that
stretches from the very small through to everyday objects.
The final issue here is whether we could or should challenge my diagnosis
of (2)–(7) by interpreting these arguments as making claims only about
compositional constitution. If this were so, then the symmetry with argument
(1) would be restored. On this view, the original intuitions that persons and
statues are something more than physical particles arranged in a certain way
would turn out to be mistaken or indefensible, as would the similar intuitions
about persons and bodies, on the one hand, and statues and pieces of marble,
on the other. The same general view might then be adopted with respect
to each of (4a)–(7a) and the corresponding arguments in which they each
feature that appeal to the transitivity of constitution. My own view is that this
would make each of (2a)–(7a) false—certainly it would make them claims
facing an uphill battle against many of the intuitions that have motivated
philosophers to explore constitution views in metaphysics. In any case, the
strategy of interpreting (2a)–(7a) as making claims only about compositional
constitution in effect denies the existence of ampliative constitution, for there
are no better putative examples of this relation. If ampliative constitution
is not transitive, as I have suggested it is not, such a denial is required for
anyone who wants to defend the idea that constitution per se is a transitive
relation.
7. Conclusion
Philosophers have long been wary of easy and common appeals to consti-
tution, in part because in some contexts (e.g., being a male is a constituent
of being a bachelor) the relevant notion of constitution is conceptual or
semantic, while in others (e.g., particles are constituents of chairs) it is phys-
ical or material in nature. “‘Constitutes?’—in what sense?” is one common
plea heard around the philosophy table (or should be). If the argument of
this paper is correct, then we have reason to be similarly wary of appeals
to material constitution simpliciter, and to ask “‘Materially constitutes?’—in
what sense?”. Rather than suggesting that this wariness should lead us to
eschew the concept of material constitution altogether, I have tried to show
how attention to a more fine-grained view of this concept helps to explain
some core intuitions about material constitution, and to see our way through
some puzzles involving that concept.
That is at least the view of the forest. The substance of the paper, fo-
cused as it is on a few trees, has been on one putative property of material
constitution, transitivity. In probing this ubiquitously assumed property of
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material constitution we have seen reasons to question both whether relations
of material constitution need be transitive and whether arguments invoking
material constitution that appear to make appropriate use of a transitivity
rule in fact do so.
The case of physical realization is not only instructive but perhaps also
reassuring when it comes to the implications of the failures of appeals to
transitivity for which I have argued. A general metaphysics incorporating
physical realization may have to accept that there are forms of this relation
that are not transitive. The same is true, I have argued, of material consti-
tution. Those of us deploying constitution or realization should not assume
that either relation is or must be transitive, or that we can simply appeal
to transitivity in arguments that start with claims about the constitution of
ordinary physical entities, such as people or statues, or the realization of
familiar properties, such as intentionality and consciousness.
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